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Scott v. Bradford 
606 P.2d 554 (Okla. 1979) 
(Editor's Note: With the gracious permission of ChiefJustice John 
B. Doolin * of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, we reprint below ex­
cerpts from his opinion in Scott v. Bradford. t We include these ex­
cerpts because they represent a judicial opinion addressing the issue of 
disclosure and consent between physician and patient as Professor Katz! 
thinks it should be addressed. Many courts have enunciated a disclo­
sure standard based upon the information which a patient needs to have 
disclosed rather than upon that information which a physician believes a 
patient needs to have disclosed. Nevertheless, once faced with the issue 
of causation between failure to disclose and injury resulting from non­
disclosure, courts often decide questions on the basis of what reasonable 
patients would have done rather than upon consideration of what this 
patient would have done ifprovided the requisite information. Professor 
Katz, arguing that the application of a "reasonable patient" standard 
"contradicts the right of each individual to decide what will be done 
with his or her body, "(p. 76) applauds this decision: "Justice Doolin 
recognized that if the grand rhetoric of self-determination is to have 
meaning, framing the question in terms of the decision of a reasonable 
person grossly and unnecessarily substitutes judicial paternalism at a 
critically wrong point." (p. 77). Here, Justice Doolin speaks for himself 
in illustration of Professor Katz's theory.) 
* * * 
This appeal is taken by plaintiffs in trial below, from a judgment 
in favor of defendant rendered on a jury verdict in a medical malprac­
tice action. 
* * * 
Mrs. Scott, joined by her husband, filed the present action alleg­
ing medical malpractice, claiming defendant failed to advise her of the 
risks involved or of available alternatives to surgery. She further 
maintained had she been properly informed she would have refused 
the surgery. 
• Chief Justice, Oklahoma Supreme Court. 
t 606 P.2d 554 (Okla. 1979). 
t J. KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984). 
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The case was submitted to the jury with instructions to which 
plaintiffs objected. The jury found for defendant and plaintiffs appeal. 
* * * 
Anglo-American law starts with the premise of thoroughgoing 
self-determination, each man considered to be his own master. This 
law does not permit a physician to substitute his judgment for that of 
the patient by any form of artifice. l The doctrine of informed consent 
arises out of this premise. 
Consent to medical treatment, to be effective, should stem from 
an understanding decision based on adequate information about the 
treatment, the available alternatives, and the collateral risks. This re­
quirement, labeled "informed consent," is, legally speaking, as essen­
tial as a physician's care and skill in the performance of the therapy. 
The doctrine imposes a duty on a physician or surgeon to inform a 
patient of his options and their attendant risks. Ifa physician breaches 
this duty, patient's consent is defective, and physician is responsible 
for the consequences. 2 
If treatment is completely unauthorized and performed without 
any consent at all, there has been a battery.3 However, if the physician 
obtains a patient's consent but has breached his duty to inform, the 
patient has a cause of action sounding in negligence for failure to in­
form the patient of his options, regardless of the due care exercised at 
treatment, assuming there is injury.4 
* * * 
A patient's right to make up his mind whether to undergo treat­
ment should not be delegated to the local medical group. What is 
reasonable disclosure in one instance may not be reasonable in an­
other.7 We decline to adopt a standard based on the professional stan­
dard. We, therefore, hold the scope of a physician's communications 
must be measured by his patient's need to know enough to enable him 
to make· an intelligent choice. In other words, full disclosure of all 
material risks incident to treatment must be made. There is no bright 
line separating the material from the immaterial; it is a question of 
I. See Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093 (1960), reh. den. 187 Kan. 
186,354 P.2d 670 (1960). See also Rolater v. Strain, 390 Okla. 572, 137 P. 96 (1913) [The 
footnotes in Scott v. Bradford have been placed into law review form for the ease of the 
reader. The footnote numbers correspond to those in the original text]. 
2. Martin v. Stratton, 515 P.2d 1366 (Okla. 1973). 
3. See Rolater, 390 Okla. 572, 137 P. 96; Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 
676 (1972). 
4. Wilkinson, 110 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 676. 
7. Id. 
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fact. A risk is material if it would be likely to affect patient's decision. 
When non-disclosure of a particular risk is open to debate, the issue is 
for the finder of facts. 8 
This duty to disclose is the first element of the cause of action in 
negligence based on lack of informed consent. However, there are ex­
ceptions creating a privilege of a physician not to disclose. There is no 
need to disclose risks that either ought to be known by everyone or are 
already known to the patient.9 Further, the primary duty of a physi­
cian is to do what is best for his patient and where full disclosure 
would be detrimental to a patient's total care and best interests a phy­
sician may withhold such disclosure, \0 for example, where disclosure 
would alarm an emotionally upset or apprehensive patient. Certainly 
too, where there is an emergency and the patient is in no condition to 
determine for himself whether treatment should be administered, the 
privilege may be invoked. I I 
* * * 
The cause of action, based on lack of informed consent, is divided 
into three elements: the duty to inform being the first, the second is 
causation, and the third is injury. The second element, that of causa­
tion, requires that plaintiff patient would have chosen no treatment or 
a different course of treatment had the alternatives and material risks 
of each been made known to him. If the patient would have elected to 
proceed with treatment had he been duly informed of its risks, then 
the element of causation is missing. In other words, a causal connec­
tion exists between physician's breach of the duty to disclose and pa­
tient's . injury when and only when disclosure of material risks 
incidental to treatment would have resulted in a decision against it. 12 
A patient obviously has no complaint if he would have submitted to 
the treatment if the physician had complied with his duty and in­
formed him of the risks. This fact decision raises the difficult question 
of the correct standard on which to instruct the jury. 
The court in Canterbury v. Spence, supra, although emphasizing 
principles of self-determination permits liability only if non-disclosure 
would have affected the decision of a fictitious "reasonable patient," 
8. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Natanson v. Kline, 187 
Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960); Woods v. Brumlop, 71 N.M. 221, 377 P.2d 520 (1962). 
9. Yeates v. Harms, 193 Kan. 320, 393 P.2d 982 (1964). 
10. Nishi v. Hartwell, 52 Haw. 188, 473 P.2d \16 (1970). 
11. Woods, 71 N.M. 221, 377 P.2d 520. 
12. Martin v. Stratton, 515 P.2d 1366 (Okla. 1973); See also Holt v. Nelson, \1 
Wash. App. 230, 523 P.2d 211 (1974). 
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even though actual patient testifies he would have elected to forego 
therapy had he been fully informed. 
Decisions discussing informed consent have emphasized the dis­
closure element but paid scant attention to the consent element of the 
concept, although this is the root of causation. Language in some de­
cisions suggest the standard to be applied is a subjective one, i.e., 
whether that particular patient would still have consented to the treat­
ment, reasonable choice or otherwise. See Woods v. Brumlop, supra, n. 
8; Wilkinson v. Vesey, supra, n. 3; Gray v. Grunnogle, 423 Pa. 144, 223 
A.2d 663 (1966); Poulin v. Zartman, 542 P.2d 251 (Alaska 1975), reh. 
den. 548 P.2d 1299 (Alaska 1976). 
Although the Canterbury rule is probably that of the majority, I3 
its "reasonable man" approach has been criticized by some commenta­
tors l4 as backtracking on its own theory of self-determination. The 
Canterbury view certainly severely limits the protection granted an in­
jured patient. To the extent the plaintiff, given an adequate disclosure, 
would have declined the proposed treatment, and a reasonable person 
in similar circumstances would have consented, a patient's right of 
self-determination is irrevocably lost. This basic right to know and de­
cide is the reason for the full-disclosure rule. Accordingly, we decline 
to jeopardize this right by the imposition of the "reasonable man" 
standard. 
If a plaintiff testifies he would have continued with the proposed 
treatment had he been adequately informed, the trial is over under 
either the SUbjective or objective approach. If he testifies he would 
not, then the causation problem must be resolved by examining the 
credibility of plaintiff's testimony. The jury must be instructed that it 
must find plaintiff would have refused the treatment if he is to prevail. 
Although it might be said this approach places a physician at the 
mercy of a patient's hindsight, a careful practitioner can always pro­
tect himself by insuring that he has adequately informed each patient 
he treats. If he does not breach this duty, a causation problem will not 
arise. 
The final element of this cause of action is that of injury. The risk 
must actually materialize and plaintiff must have been injured as a 
13. See Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d I, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972); Funke 
v. Fieldman, 212 Kan. 524, 512 P.2d 539 (1973); Archer v. Galbraith, 18 Wash. App. 369, 
567 P.2d 1155 (1977). 
14. Katz, Informed Consent-A Fairy Tale? Law's Vision, 39 U. PIIT. L. REV. 137 
(1977); Seidelson, Medical Malpractice: Informed Consent Cases in "Full Disclosure" Juris­
dictions, 14 DUQ. L. REV. 309 (1976). 
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result of submitting to the treatment. Absent occurrence of the undis­

closed risk, a physician's failure to reveal its possibility is not 

actionable. 15 

* * * 
15. Hales v. Pittman, 118 Ariz. 305, 576 P.2d 493 (1978); Downer v. Veilleux, 322 

A.2d 82 (Me. 1974). 

